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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Pony Lee Jackson appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief after 
an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Jackson filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief from his conviction 
for two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of 16. (R., pp. 1-5.) 
The state moved for summary dismissal of the petition. (R., pp. 82-83.) The 
district court granted partial summary dismissal. (R., pp. 101-32.) The remaining 
claims proceeded to an evidentiary hearing (R., pp. 172-74), following which the 
district court denied relief (R., pp. 197-218). Jackson timely appealed. (R., pp. 
220-22.) 
1 
ISSUE 
Jackson states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying claims two and seven of Mr. 
Jackson's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief following an 
evidentiary hearing on the claims? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Jackson failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that 
Jackson failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to 
opening statement and evidence that the victim disclosed the lewd conduct in 
response to a police solicitation that anyone molested by Jackson come forward? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
Jackson Failed To Prove Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Jackson claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object on 
the basis that the prosecutor violated a pre-trial ruling by the court by referencing 
in his opening statement and ultimately proffering evidence that the victim came 
forward after hearing a police solicitation requesting Jackson's victims to come 
forward. (R., pp. 28-31, 50-55.) The district court concluded that the evidence 
discussed and presented by the prosecutor was admissible, and therefore there 
was neither deficient performance nor prejudice from a lack of objection by trial 
counsel. (R., pp. 205-08, 213.) Jackson contends "the district court's factual 
findings were clearly erroneous, and that the district court's analysis on the claim 
was both legally and factually erroneous." (Appellant's brief, p. 10.) Review of 
the record shows ample evidence in support of the district court's factual findings 
and application of the relevant law shows no error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings 
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of 
law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). 
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, 
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the 
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province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 
110 (Ct. App. 2003). A trial court's decision that a post-conviction petitioner has 
not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 
Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964,965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
C. The District Court Did Not Err In Concluding That The Prosecutor's 
Actions Were Not Contrary To The Court's Pre-Trial Order And Therefore 
Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Object 
The district court made the following findings regarding the claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's mention of a police 
inquiry regarding Pony Jackson being the impetus for the victim to disclose the 
prior sexual abuse to the police: 
The court's instruction to the parties was that the Victim 
could testify there had been a law enforcement inquiry regarding 
Jackson that prompted her to contact them. But, she was to "stay 
away" from the charges. The charges referred to in the Solicitation 
were child pornography charges. 
The prosecutor's reference to law enforcement's Solicitation 
did not mention the child pornography charges and, therefore, 
complied with the court's order. 
(R., p. 206.) The court concluded that the prosecutor's comments and the 
victim's testimony did not violate the court's order; that the evidence that the 
victim responded to a police solicitation was admissible and only the evidence 
regarding possession of child pornography was inadmissible; that the lack of an 
objection was not deficient performance; and that Jackson had proved no 
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prejudice. (R., pp. 208, 213. 1) The record in the criminal case supports the 
district court's findings of fact. 
Jackson, through counsel, moved in limine to exclude evidence of three 
things: (1) his "prior conviction ... and pending charges for child pornography," 
(2) his "written statements regarding sexual activity," and (3) an allegation 
'reported to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office in 1998 wherein an adolescent 
female disclosed that Pony Jackson had sexually abused her in Jefferson 
County."' (#36968 R, pp. 17-18.) At the hearing defense counsel clarified that 
the first issue addressed "a television report that asked for someone to come 
forward with any information about any alleged abuse by the defendant. That 
had to do with child pornography charges. And so first, what we're asking for is 
that any evidence of that charge and that conviction of the child pornography 
charges be excluded under Rule 404." (#36968 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 2-14 (emphasis 
added).) The district court informed counsel of some potential rulings, but 
reserved any final ruling on admissibility for trial. (#36968 Tr., p. 25, L. 22 - p. 
27, L. 3.) 
Just prior to trial the prosecutor sought clarification on the admissibility of 
evidence the victim had come forward years after the abuse in response to news 
1 The trial court also concluded that Jackson had failed to show how I.RE. 404(b) 
even applied to the statement and evidence regarding the police inquiry and also 
concluded that the evidence in question (and the statement regarding the same) 
was admissible. (R, pp. 203-04, 206-07.) Although the statement implied and 
the testimony stated that police suspected there were other victims, such is not 
actually evidence of any prior bad act. By definition this evidence was not 
covered by I.RE. 404(b). Moreover, the court concluded that such was 
admissible because any unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of 
the evidence. 
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reports that Jackson "had been arrested for child pornography and the news said 
if anyone out there has been molested by Pony Jackson, would you please 
contact law enforcement." (#36968 Tr., p. 33, L. 21 - p. 34, L. 13.) The district 
court stated that "evidence of charges for child pornography ... can be unfairly 
prejudicial" but the victim could testify "she saw a report about Pony Jackson." 
(#36968 Tr., p. 34, L. 14 - p. 35, L. 3.) The prosecutor then asked: 
[The Prosecutor]: But don't mention it was on child 
pornography; she saw a report? 
THE COURT: Yeah, it wasn't based on child pornography 
issues but that he was involved-that he was-that he was 
involved-there was a law enforcement inquiry regarding Pony 
Jackson and that prompted her to come forward, something 
general and innocuous like that. Certainly she can talk about this 
was generated by a law enforcement inquiry; but if she can stay 
away from the charges, were going to be a lot better off. 
(#36968 Tr., p. 35, Ls. 4-14.) The court advised the prosecutor that "right now" 
he would "want to treat that as unfairly prejudicial, the prejudice doesn't outweigh 
the probative value." (#36968 Tr., p. 35, L. 21 - p. 36, L. 1.) 
The prosecutor in opening statement informed the jury that the victim 
came forward after hearing "a report on the news that anybody who had been 
molested by Pony Jackson, if they would contact the sheriff's office or law 
enforcement." (#36968 Tr., p. 136, Ls. 2-9.) At trial, the prosecutor asked the 
victim what "brought [her report] about," to which she responded, "My mom called 
and told me that on the news they had said that Pony Jackson had been arrested 
and that anybody else that had been molested by him, to please come forward." 
(#36968 Tr., p. 186, Ls. 1-5.) Neither the prosecutor nor the victim referenced 
child pornography. 
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At the evidentiary hearing in post-conviction, the prosecutor testified that 
he believed the court had granted him permission to address the news report in a 
limited fashion for the purpose of bridging the gap between the sexual 
molestation and the report to the police almost 15 years later. (Tr., p. 71, L. 19 -
p. 78, L. 15.) The defense attorney testified that his trial strategy was to rely on 
the length of time between the abuse and the disclosure and the lack of 
corroboration to attack the victim's credibility. (Tr., p. 111, Ls. 5-11.) He moved 
to exclude evidence under I.RE. 404(b). (Tr., p. 107, L. 25 - p. 108, L. 14.) He 
also testified that although he had no recollection of the specific part of the 
opening statement regarding the news report, he generally did not object in 
opening statement unless an opening statement is egregious or prejudicial. (Tr., 
p. 111, L. 22- p. 113, L. 9.) He likewise had no recollection of the victim's 
testimony about hearing about the news report, but believed that an objection 
would have been sustained. (Tr., p. 113, L. 10 - p. 114, L. 15.) 
The district court's findings are supported by the record. The record 
establishes that a news report stated that Jackson had been charged for 
possession of child pornography and police were requesting that anyone 
molested by Jackson come forward. Trial Counsel moved to exclude evidence 
related to possession of child pornography and succeeded. Counsel did not 
move to exclude evidence that the police had solicited anyone who had been 
molested to come forward. The court's order must be considered in light of the 
motion it was granting, and the motion was clearly related to child pornography 
and not the police solicitation. 
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The district court's factual findings that neither the prosecutor's opening 
statement nor the victim's testimony violated the pre-trial ruling of the district 
court is dispositive of Jackson's claims his attorney was ineffective for failing to 
object on the basis of the pre-trial ruling. In order to prove a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both 
deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 
299, 307 (1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient 
unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable .... " Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). The court must apply a "strong 
presumption of competence." Cullen v. Pinholster, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 
1388, 1407 (2011 ). To overcome the presumption of competence the party 
claiming deficient performance must prove that the strategic decision to not 
object "resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or 
other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 
561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). See also Hinton v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 134 
S.Ct. 1081, 1088-89 (2014) (counsel's decision to not seek additional expert 
witness at state expense deficient because counsel was unaware of law allowing 
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him to do so). "Failing to object to arguably inadmissible testimony will generally 
be insufficient to overcome the presumption that the decision was based on 
sound legal strategy." Cook v. State, Idaho , P.3d , 2014 WL 
- -- -
4290413, *3 (Ct. App. 2014). 2 Prejudice is found only if petitioner shows "that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) 
(quotations omitted). 
Jackson's claim was based entirely upon the assertion that the 
prosecutor's opening statement and the victim's testimony were excludable as 
being contrary to the district court's pre-trial ruling. That pre-trial ruling prohibited 
mention of the child pornography possession and charges, but allowed evidence 
that the victim came forward in response to a police solicitation. It did not prohibit 
the state from addressing what information the police had solicited. Indeed, what 
information the police solicited was central to the relevance of the disclosure. 
The prosecutor thereafter included in his statement the representation that the 
evidence would show that the victim came forward and reported the lewd 
conduct to the police in response to a police solicitation for information from 
"anybody who had been molested by Pony Jackson" (#36968 Tr., p. 136, Ls. 2-9) 
and elicited testimony from the witness that she had reported the lewd conduct in 
2 Much of Jackson's sufficiency of the evidence argument seems to be premised 
on the evidence not affirmatively establishing a tactical reason for the lack of 
objections. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 27-31.) Because there is a presumption 
that counsel was effective and a presumption that a lack of objection was a 
tactical choice, Jackson had the burden of proving an objective deficiency such 
as inadequate preparation or ignorance of the law. This correct legal standard 
should be applied to his arguments. 
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response to a police request that "anybody else that had been molested by him, 
to please come forward" (#36968 Tr., p. 186, Ls. 1-5). Because the district court 
did not proscribe the state from presenting evidence showing what information 
the police were seeking, Jackson's counsel was not objectively deficient for 
claiming it had, and Jackson suffered no prejudice. 
On appeal Jackson acknowledges that neither the prosecutor nor the 
victim "specifically reference [the] possession of child pornography charges" 
subject to the trial court's order, but claims they "referenced something arguably 
worse." (Appellant's brief, p. 18.) The flaw in this argument is that Jackson did 
not claim ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to "something 
arguably worse" than the evidence excluded in the pre-trial ruling, but claimed 
that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting "to the prosecutor's blatant and 
deliberate disregard of the court's order" or the "victim's actual testimony when it 
violated the district court's order." (R., pp. 39, 63.) Jackson is effectively trying 
to amend his petition on appeal rather than show error in the district court's ruling 
on the claim he actually made. 
Jackson's argument that the court ordered the prosecutor to say 
something "general and innocuous" likewise fails. The court did not rule on an 
issue not before it. Although the court used an example and encouraged 
"something general and innocuous like that" example, such was in the context of 
stating the victim should "stay away from the charges." (#36948 Tr., p. 34, L. 25 
- p. 36, L. 1.) The court never held that the state could not inform the jury what 
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information had been sought in the police solicitation that prompted the victim to 
come forward. 3 Thus, it was simply not ineffective counsel to claim that it had. 
Jackson failed to prove any objective deficiency in counsel's performance 
by not claiming that the prosecutor had violated the trial court's pre-trial order. 
Likewise, he failed to prove any prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
DATED this 20th day of January, 2015. 
,0\ l\\ \iwti"rr. ~~ 
Deputy Attorney 
3 The distinction between the prior bad acts evidence of possession of child 
pornography and evidence of what information the police were seeking (which is 
not itself a prior bad act) is also important in the district court's analysis of the 
admissibility of the evidence. (R., pp. 203-04, 206-08.) This distinction is lost on 
Jackson, who apparently believes that the evidence was admitted to show that 
he has sexually abused other children. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-26.) Because 
evidence that the victim disclosed her sexual abuse in response to a police 
request for just that sort of information was admissible, there was neither 
deficient performance nor prejudice. The district court may be affirmed on this 
alternative basis. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of January, 2015, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
ELIZABETH A. ALLRED 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
KKJ/pm 
KENNETH K. J 
Deputy Attorn 
12 
